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EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
Eyewitness identifications, perhaps more than any 
other type of evidence, have contributed to miscar-
riages of justice. Case histories of convictions. based 
upon misidentifications have been documented by a 
number of authors. See E. Block, The Vindicators 
(1963); E. Borchard, Convicting the Innocent (1932); 
J. Frank & B. Frank, Not Guilty (1957); F. Frankfurter, 
The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti (1927); E. Gardner, 
The Court of Last Resort (1952); Q. Reynolds, Court-
room (1950); G. Williams, The Proof of Guilt (3d ed. 
1963); O'Connor, "That's the Man": A Sobering Study 
of Eyewitness Identification and the Polygraph, 49 St. 
John's L. Rev. 1 (1974). Furthermore, psychological 
research has identified numerous deficiencies in iden-
tification testimony. One of the most thorough treat-
ments of the psychological aspects of identifications 
appears in an American Bar Foundation study. Levine 
iil & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: 
'f!fff The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1079 
· (1973). That study concluded with the following com-
ment: "This review of the psychological dimensions of 
eyewitness identification has shown that the dangers 
from fallible sense perception and memory and from 
suggestive influence are overwhelming." /d. at 1130. 
This article examines the constitutional and eviden-
tiary problems associated with eyewitness identifica-
tions. 
Right to Counsel 
Prior to 1967 the reliability of eyewitness identifica-
tions was primarily a jury issue. In that year, however, 
the Supreme Court decided three cases that "con-
stitutionalized" this area of criminal law. Two of the 
cases- United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); 
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)- involved 
the sixth amendment right to counsel. Because of the 
innumerable ways in which identification procedures 
can erroneously affect eyewitness identifications, the 
Court in Wade held that a lineup is a "critical stage" of 
the criminal process, thereby entitling the defendant to 
the assistance of counsel. The presence of counsel, 
according to the Court, would assure that a defendant 
could effectively challenge a subsequent in-court iden-
tification based upon a suggestive pretrial identifica-
tion. 
Since it appears that there is grave potential 
for prejudice, intentional or not, in the pretrial 
lineup, which may not be capable of recon-
struction at trial, and since presence of coun-
sel itself can often avert prejudice and assure 
a meaningful confrontation at trial, there cari 
be little doubt that . . . [a post-indictment 
lineup is] a critical stage of the prosecution 
388 U.S. at 236-37. 
Subsequently, in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 
( 1972), the Court restricted the right to counsel. Under 
Kirby, the right to counsel attaches only after the "in-
itiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings 
.... " !d. at 689. Thus, Kirby ignores the underlying 
rationale of Wade, which is the need to protect the 
accused's ability to confront effectively the 
eyewitnesses' identification at trial. The "grave poten-
tial for prejudice" associated with identification proce-
dures is not diminished simply because judicial crimi-
nal proceedings have not yet commenced. In addition, 
the Court in Kirby failed to specify exactly when the 
right to counsel attached. Wade involved a lineup 
conducted after indictment while. Kirby involved a 
lineup immediately following arrest. Some courts used 
this factual difference in the two cases as a basis for 
holding that the right to counsel applies only to post-
indictment identifications. The Supreme Court recently 
rejected this view. In Moore v. Illinois, 98 S. Ct. 458 
( 1977), the Court reversed a defendant's conviction 
because he had not been afforded counsel at an iden-
tification made at the preliminary hearing: "The Court 
of Appeals therefore erred in holding that petitioner's 
rights under Wade and Gilbert had not yet attached at 
the time of the preliminary hearing." /d. at 465. 
While the Court has yet to decide a case involving a 
lineup held prior to the preliminary hearing, language 
in several of its opinions strongly suggests the right to 
counsel may attach as early as the issuance of an 
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arrest warrant, the filing of a complaint, or the initial 
appearance. The Court's explication of the phrase 
"adversary judicial criminal proceedings" in Kirby 
included the "formal charge, preliminary hearing, in-
dictment, information, or arraignment." 406 U.S. at 
689. Since the Court explicitly mentions indictment 
and information, the term "formal charge" must refer 
to some other charging instrument. The only instru-
ment besides an indictment or information that would 
qualify as a charging document is a complaint. See 2 
0. Schroeder & L. Katz, Ohio Criminal Law 126 
(1974) ("Rule 3 spells out the requirements for the 
complaint, the basic charging document under the 
rules.") This view is also supported by the Court's 
language in Moore: "The prosecution in this case was 
commenced under Illinois law when the victim's com-
plaint was filed in court." 98 S. Ct. at 464. 
Although not involving identification procedures, 
another recent Supreme Court case sheds some light 
on this issue. In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 
( 1977), the Court considered the right to counsel in 
the context of police interrogation procedures. After 
referring to the Kirby standard, the Court stated: 
"There can be no doubt in the present case that judi-
cial proceedings have been initiated against Williams 
.... A warrant had been issued for his arrest, he had 
been arraigned on that warrant before a judge in a 
Davenport courtroom, and he had been committed by 
the court to confinement in jail." /d. at 399. This pas-
sage demonstrates that the Court in Kirby was not 
using the term "arraignment" in its technical sense 
(Grim. R. 1 0), but was referring to the initial appear-
ance (Grim. R. 5(A)). It is common practice in many 
jurisdictions to refer to the initial appearance as an 
arraignment. See Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave, & J. Israel, 
Modern Criminal Procedure 8 (4th Ed. 1974). This 
same usage of arraignment appears in Holland v. Pe-
rini, 512 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1975). Holland was arrested 
on May 9, 1970 for the robbery of a Cleveland res-
taurant, which had occurred the same day. The Sixth 
Circuit held that a station-house identification con-
ducted on May 24 violated the right to counsel under 
Wade because the defendant had "been arraigned, 
and adversary criminal proceedings had begun." /d. 
at 103. It is clear that the court was referring to the 
initial appearance under Rule 5 when it employed the 
term "arraignment" because in another part of the 
opinion the court states: "Arraignment occurred on 
May 11 , and indictment followed on May 25." /d. at 
1 02. The court left open the question of whether the 
right to counsel "attach[ed] automatically upon the fil-
ing of an affidavit .... " /d. n. 1. One court, however, 
has held that the issuance of an arrest warrant upon 
information triggers the right to counsel. United States 
ex ref. Robinson v. Zelker, 468 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 
1972). For citations to other cases, see All Model 
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 448 (1975). 
Presence of Counsel 
The courts are divided on whether the right to 
counsel encompasses the actual identification of a 
suspect by an eyewitness (some.times called the 
"witness-response stage") as well as the viewing of 
the suspect by that witness. The leading case on this 
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issue is People v. Williams, 3 Cal.3d 853, 478 P .2d 
942 (1971), in which the California Supreme Court 
held that the right to counsel extends to the actual 
identification: "It is not the moment of viewing alone, 
but rather the whole 'procedure by which (a suspect) 
is identified' that counsel must be able to effectively 
reconstruct at trial. If defense counsel is to be able to 
intelligently cross-examine the witness, he cannot be 
excluded from the moment of identification any more 
than he can be excluded from the lineup itself." ld. at 
856, 478 P.2d at 944. The Louisiana Supreme Court 
recently adopted the same position in . State v. 
McGhee, 350 So.2d 370 (La. Sup. Ct. 1977). These 
cases are particularly persuasive because there is no 
legitimate reason for the police to exclude counsel 
from the witness-response stage. See Sobel, Eye-
Witness Identification: Legal and Practical Problems 
119 (1972). 
Waiver of Right to Counsel 
Although the Supreme Court in Wade recognized 
the possibility that a suspect entitled to counsel could 
waive that right, the prosecution carries a heavy bur-
den in establishing a waiver. It is incumbent upon the 
prosecution to prove "an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson 
v. Zebst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). The Supreme 
Court reiterated this standard in a recent sixth 
amendment case: "We have said that the right to 
counsel does not depend upon a request by the de-
fendant, and that courts indulge in every reasonable 
presumption against waiver. This strict standard ap-
plies equally to an alleged waiver of the right to coun-
sel whether at trial or at a critical stage of pretrial pro-
ceedings." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 
(1977). The Ohio Supreme Court has also carefully 
scrutinized alleged waivers. See State v. Hurt, 30 
Ohio St.2d 86, 282 N.E.2d 578 (1972.) 
Exclusionary Rule 
The principal remedy for violations of the right to 
counsel is the exclusionary rule. Thus, testimony con-
cerning a lineup identification at which the defendant 
was denied the right to counsel is inadmissible. Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, "[o]nly a per se ex-
clusionary rule as to such testimony can be an effec-
tive sanction to assure that law enforcement au-
thorities will respect the accused's constitutional right 
to the presence of his counsel at the critical lineup." 
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967). 
Even if the lineup is constitutionally defective be-
cause of the absence of counsel, a subsequent in-
court identification may be admissible under certain 
circumstances. The in-court identification is treated as 
a "fruit of the poisonous tree" issue; it is only admissi-
ble if the prosecution can "establish by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the in-court identifications 
[were] based upon observations of the suspect other 
than the lineup identification." United States v. Wade, 
388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967}. The factors relevant to de-
termining whether the in-court identification is derived 
from an independent source include: "the [witness'] 
prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, 
the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-
lineup description and the defendant's actual descrip-
tion, any identification prior to lineup of another per-
son the identification by picture of the defendant prior 
to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a 
prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the al-
leged act and the lineup identification." 388 U.S. at 
241. 
The stringency of the standard the prosecution 
must meet in order to establish an independent 
source is highlighted by the dissenting opinions in 
Wade. Justice Black thought the clear and convincing 
evidence standard "is practically impossible" to meet, 
while Justice White characterized the test as "admit-
tedly" a heavy burden for the State and probably an 
impossible one." /d. at 248 and 251. The principal 
Ohio cases are State v. Lathan, 30 Ohio St.2d 92, 282 
N.E.2d 574 (1972) (independent source nc;>t estab-
lished); State v. Hurt, 30 Ohio St.2d 86, 282 N.E.2d 
578 (1972) (independent source established); State v. 
Jackson, 26 Ohio St.2d 74, 269 N.E.2d 118 (1971) 
(independent source established). 
Procedurally, the constitutionality of eyewitness 
identifications should be raised prior to trial. "Motions 
to suppress evidence, including but not limited to 
statements and identification testimony, on the ground 
that it was illegally obtained" are governed by Crimi-
nal Rule 12(8)(3). 
Due Process 
At the same time it decided Wade and Gilbert, the 
Court also held that identification procedures implicate 
the due process clause. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 
293 ( 1967). This development is important because a 
criminal defendant's right to due process is more ex-
tensive than his right to counsel; all identifications are 
subject to scrutiny under a due process analysis. 
Thus, identifications made prior to the attachment of 
the right to counsel, Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 
691 (1972), identifications involving photographic dis-
plays, Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 
(1968), identifications conducted prior to the effective 
date of Wade, Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), 
and presumably, even identifications at which counsel 
is present, may be suppressed as violative of due 
process. 
The standard used by the Court in determining 
whether an identification comports with due process 
has undergone a substantial evolution since Stovall 
was decided. In Stovall, the due process test was 
whether the identification was "unnecessarily sugges-
tive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identifica-
tion." 388 U.S. at 302. The focus of this test is the 
reliability of the identification procedure used by the 
police; if the procedure is both suggestive and un-
necessary, it offends due process. Although the Court 
considered the issue in a number of cases after 
Stovall, Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 
(1968); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); 
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), it was not 
until Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), that it be-
came apparent that the Stovall standard had been al-
tered. The new standard - whether a substantial 
likelihood of misidentification has occurred - focuses 
on the reliability of the actual identification rather than 
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on the reliability of the Identification procedure. In de-
termining whether there has been a substantial likeli-
hood of misidentification the trial court must evaluate 
the "totality of the circumstances," including "the op-
portunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time 
of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the ac-
curacy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, 
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at 
the confrontation, and the length of time between the 
crime and the confrontation." /d. at 199-200. 
The Court's most recent treatment of the subject, 
Manson v. Brathwaite, 97 S. Ct. 2243 (1977), may 
have altered again the due process test. After reaf-
firming Biggers and referring to the factors cited in 
Biggers as relevant to the totality of the circum-
stances test, the Court stated: "Against these factors 
is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the sugges-
tive identification itself." /d. at 2253. Justice Marshall, 
in a dissenting opinion, read this statement as a rec-
ognition of the continued validity of Stovall: 
In assessing the reliability of the identification, 
the Court mandates weighing 'the corrupting 
effect of the suggestive identification itself' 
against the 'indicators of [a witness'] ability to 
make an accurate identification. The Court 
holds, as Neil v. Biggers, supra, failed to, that 
a due process identification inquiry must take 
account of the suggestiveness of a confronta-
tion and the likelihood that it led to misidentifi-
cation, as recognized in Stovall and Wade. 
Thus, even if a witness did have an otherwise 
adequate opportunity to view a criminal, the 
later use of a highly suggestive identification 
procedure can render his testimony inadmis-
sible. 
/d. at 2260. 
For a recent Sixth Circuit case reversing an Ohio 
conviction because of an improper eyewitness iden-
tification, see Webb v. Havener, 549 F.2d 1081 (6th 
Cir. 1977). See also, State v. Sheardon, 31 Ohio 
St.2d 20, 285 N.E.2d 335 (1972). 
Photographic Displays- Mug Shots 
While a defendant does not have a right to counsel 
at a photographic display, United States v. Ash, 413 
U.S. 300 (1973), an identification based on such a 
display may be subject to suppression on due process 
grounds. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 
(1968); State v. Perryman, 49 Ohio St.2d 14, 358 
N.E.2d 1040 (1976); State v. Hancock, 48 Ohio St.2d 
147 (1976). 
The use of photographs to bolster an in-court iden-
tification is impermissible if the photographs reveal the 
defendant's prior criminal record. In State v. Breed-
love, 26 Ohio St.2d 178, 271 N.E.2d 238 (1971), the 
Ohio Supreme Court commented on this issue: 
Under the circumstances in the case at bar, 
we believe it unjustifiable for the state, on di-
rect examination, to present police mug shots, 
bearing police identification numbers, from 
which a reasonable inference can be drawn 
that the defendant, at some indefinite time in 
the past had trouble with the law. 
!d. at 184, 271 N.E.2d 241; accord, State v. Wilkin-
son, 26 Ohio St.2d 185, 271 N.E.2d 242 (1971 ). De-
fense counsel must, however, make a timely objection 
at trial or the error is waived. State v. Evans, 32 Ohio 
St.2d 185,291 N.E.2d 466 (1972). 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues 
While it is clear that the fifth amendment privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination is not implicated 
in identification procedures, the fourth amendment 
proscription against unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures is a different matter. The fifth amendment issue 
was addressed by the Court in Wade. Relying on its 
decision in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 
(1966), the Court held that the fifth amendment ap-
plied only to "testimonial or communicative" evidence 
and that "compelling the accused merely to exhibit his 
person for observation by a prosecution witness prior 
to trial involves no compulsion of the accused to give 
evidence having testimonial significance." 388 U.S. at 
222. 
The fourth amendment issue arises when a defen-
dant is illegally detained and then compelled to submit 
to an identification procedure. In such a case the iden-
tification may be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous 
tree." Thus, in United States v. Edmonds, 432 F.2d 
577 (2d Cir. 1970), the court held that· ''where flag-
rantly illegal arrests were made for the precise pur-
pose of securing identifications that would not other-
wise have been obtained, nothing less than barring 
any use of them can adequately serve the deterrent 
purpose of the exclusionary rule." /d. at 584; accord, 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 362 Mass. 497, 287 N.E.2d 
599 (1972); State v. Accor, 277 N.C. 65, 175 S.E.2d 
583 (1970); People v. Bean, 121 Ill. App. 2d 332, 257 
N.E.2d 562 (1970). A violation of the fourth amend-
ment is independent of right to counsel or due pro-
cess considerations; therefore, an identification 
tainted by an illegal detention would be suppressed 
irrespective of the presence of counsel or the lack of 
unnecessarily suggestive procedures. 
Defendant's Right to a lineup 
In Evans v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.3d 617, 522 
P.2d 681 (1974), the California Supreme Court held 
that a defendant had a constitutional right to a State-
conducted lineup. The Court rested its decision on 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), in which the 
Supreme Court found that under certain circum-
stances the state's failure to disclose exculpatory evi-
dence violated due process. In Evans, the Court 
stated: 
Here petitioner seeks to compel the People to 
exercise a duty to discover material evidence 
which does not now, in effect, exist. Should 
petitioner be denied his right of discovery the 
net effect would be the same as if existing 
evidence were intentionally suppressed. It is 
settled that the intentional suppression of 
material evidence denies a defendant a fair 
trial. Brady v. Maryland. We conclude in view 
of the foregoing that due process requires in 
an appropriate case that an accused, upon 
timely request therefor,. be afforded a pretrial 
lineup in which witnesses to the alleged crim-
inal conduct can participate. 
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We do note parenthetically that the accused 
himself has neither the facilities nor the ex-
perience to conduct an impartial lineup. The 
burden on the police is a nominal one, as the 
facilities, resources and other individuals who 
may be used in conducting a lineup are gen-
erally available. 
11 Cal.3d at 625-6, 522 P.2d at 686. 
In United States v. Caldwell, 481 F.2d 487 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973), the defendant's conviction was reversed 
because his motion for a pretrial lineup was denied. 
The court found the prosecutor's opposition to the mo-
tion inexplicable: "the [trial] court clearly had power to 
order such a lineup, and we have considerable diffi-
culty in understanding why the prosecution chose to 
resist appellant's motion." !d. at 489. See also Berry-
man v. United States, 378 A.2d 1317 (D.C. Ct. App. 
1977). 
Hearsay 
In-court testimony concerning a pretrial identifica-
tion, either by the eyewitness or a witness to the iden-
tification, could constitute hearsay evidence. 
Nevertheless, such testimony is admissible in most 
jurisdictions as either an exception to the hearsay rule 
or for a nonhearsay purpose - corroboration of the 
in-court identification. R.C. 2945.55 controls the ad-
missibility of such evidence; that provision reads: 
"When identification of the defendant is an issue, a 
witness who has on previous occasion identified such 
person may testify to such previous identification. 
Such identification may be proved by other witness-
es." In State v. Lancaster, 25 Ohio St.2d- 83, 267 
N.E.2d 291 (1971), the Ohio Supreme Court inter-
preted that provision as admitting prior identifications 
"solely for the purpose of indicating the process by 
which the accused was identified, where said process 
is under attack, and to corroborate that identification." 
/d. at 92, 267 N.E.2d at 297. Thus, such evidence is 
admissible for corroboration only, which means the 
eyewitness must first identify the defendant in court. 
The proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence accord such 
identifications a somewhat different treatment. Rule 
801 (D)(1 )(c) follows the Federal Rules of Evidence 
and treats prior identifications as nonhearsay evi-
dence. Thus, prior identifications would be admissible 
even if the eyewitness does not testify at trial. See 
generally, 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence 801-102 (1975). 
Jury Instructions 
Several courts, in an attempt to minimize the dan-
gers of eyewitness identifications, have required 
cautionary instructions. In United States v. Telfaire, 
469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court proposed the 
following model instruction: 
One of the most important issues in this case 
is the identification of the defendant as the 
perpetrator of the crime. The Government has 
the burden of proving identity, beyond a 
reasonable doubt. It is not essential that the 
witness himse.lf be free from doubt as to the 
correctness of his statement. However, you, 
the jury, must be satisfied beyond a reasona-
ble doubt of the accuracy of the identification 
of the defendant before you may convict him. 
If you ar:e not convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was the person who 
committed the crime, you must find the de-
fendant not guilty. 
Identification testimony is an expression of 
belief or impression by the witness. Its value 
depends on the opportunity the witness had 
to observe the offender at the time of the of-
fense and to make a reliable identification 
later. 
In appraising the identification testimony of 
a witness, you should consider the following: 
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had 
the capacity and an adequate opportunity to 
observe the offender? 
Whether the witness had an adequate op-
portunity to observe the offender at the time 
of the offense will be affected by such matters 
as how long or short a time was available, 
how far or close the witness was, how good 
were lighting conditions, whether the witness 
had had occasion to see or know the person 
in the past. 
[In general, a witness bases any identifica-
tion he makes on his perception through the 
use of his senses. Usually the witness iden-
tifes an offender by the sense of sight - but 
this is not necessarily so, and he may use 
other senses.] 
(2) Are you satisfied that the identification 
made by the witness subsequent to the of-
fense was the product of his own recollec-
tion? You may take into account both the 
strength of the identification, and the circum-
stances under which the identification was 
made. 
If the identification by the witness may have 
been influenced by the circumstances under 
which the defendant was presented to him for 
identification, you should scrutinize the iden-
tification with great care. You may also con-
sider the length of time that lapsed between 
the occurrence of the crime and the next op-
portunity of the witness to see defendant, as a 
factor bearing on the reliability of the identifi-
cation. 
[You may also take into account that an 
identification made by picking the defendant 
out of a group of similar individuals is gener-
ally more reliable than one which results from 
~the presentation of the defendant alone to the 
witness.] 
[(3) You may take into account any occa-
sions in which the witness failed to make an 
identification of defendant, or made an iden-
tification that was inconsistent with his iden: 
tification at trial.] 
(4) Finally, you must consider the credibility 
of each identification witness in the same way 
as any other witness, consider whether he is 
truthful, and consider whether he had the 
capacity and opportunity to make· a reliable 
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observation on the matter covered in his tes-
timony. 
1 again emphasize that the burden of proof 
on the prosecutor extends to every e: 1~ment.of 
the crime charged, and this spec1f1cally m-
cludes the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant 
as the perpetrator of the crime .w!th which he 
stands charged. If after examm1ng the tes-
timony, you have a reasonable doubt as to 
the accuracy of the identification, you mu~t 
find the defendant not guilty. (Paragr~phs 1n 
brackets are to be used only if appropnate.) 
/d. at 558-59. The Telfaire court emphasized th~t a 
failure to use the model instruction with appropnate 
adaptations "would constitute a risk [of reversal] in fu-
ture cases." /d. at 557. Several courts have explici!IY 
mandated the use of this instruction or a substantial 
equivalent. United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650, 
653 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 
273, 275 (4th Cir. 1974). Other courts have expressed 
their approval of the instruction. United States v. 
Roundtree, 527 F.2d 16, 19 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 424 U.S. 923 (1976); United States v. Wilford, 
493 F.2d 730, 734 n.9 (3d Cir.), cert. deni~~· ~ 19 
U.S. 85l (1974). In most eyewitness identification 
cases, the defense should request such an instruc-
tion. 
Expert Psychological Testimony 
Although there are few reported cases on the sub~; 
ject, the use of expert testimony on the problems of 
eyewitness identifications would be helpful to a jury's 
evaluation of identifications. Several trial courts have 
admitted this type of testimony. Note, Did Your Eyes 
Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the 
Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan. L. 
Rev. 969, 1006 n.173 (1977). Assuming the expert is 
qualified, the principal objection to this type of evi-
dence is that the subject matter of eyewitness identifi~ 
cations is not outside the common knowledge of 
jurors. The modern trend, however, is against adopt-
ing a narrow view of the scope of expert testimony. 
Thus, proposed Ohio Rule of Evidence 702 states: "If 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert . . . may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise." The purpose of expert tes-
timony, as manifested in the proposed Rule, is to 
assist the trier of fact. The Advisory Committee Note 
to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which is identical to 
proposed Ohio Rule 702, observes that the Rule 
"recognizes that an expert on the stand may give a 
dissertation or exposition of scientific or other princi-
ples relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to 
apply them to the facts." In view of studies which indi-
cate that jurors are overly impressed by eyewitness 
identifications, an exposition on the psychology of 
identifications would be extremely valuable. See Note, 
29 Stan. L. Rev., supra, at 970 n.B. For a discussion 
of Federal Rule 702, see 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 
Weinstein's Evidenc·e 702-4 (1975). 
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Right To Be Present At Trial 
The journal entry of the sentencing court recited 
that the defendant was before the court when in fact 
the official transcript showed the defendant was not 
present at the time she was found _guilty and sen-
tenced. Since Cnm. R. 43(A) provides that a defen-
dant shall be present at every stage of the trial, includ-
ing the imposition of the sentence, the judgment and 
sentence were reversed. State v. Welch, 53 Ohio 
St.2d 47 (Athens Cty. 1978). 
Probable Cause and Improper Closing Arguments 
Defendant was arrested after a search of his person 
produced a glassine packet of heroin inside the 
rolled-up portion of his jeans. The arresting officer had 
entered a bar in which drugs were sold and where 
four drug-related arrests had recently been made. 
Despite the fact that the room was full, the officer fo-
cused his attention entirely on the defendant whose 
name and record were unknown to him. The officer 
had earlier seen the defendant with persons arrested 
for narcotics and observed the defendant le11n forward 
and place his hands and arms urider the table in the 
vicinity of his legs. The defendant was stopped and 
searched when he attempted to leave the premises. 
Under the circumstances, the Court found that the of-
ficer had reason to be suspicious of the defendant, 
but there was no probable cause to arrest him. Also, 
the prosecutor in his closing argument in effect told 
the jury that they could disbelieve an officer testifying 
for the prosecution only at their monetary peril; if they 
found against the officer, the city would have to pay. 
Such direct appeals to the pecuniary interest of the 
jury as taxpayers constitute reversible error. State v. 
Hill, 52 Ohio App.2d 393 (Hamilton Cty, 1977). 
Physical Restraints on Defendant at Trial 
At trial, the judge overruled a motion by defense 
counsel to remove the shackles from the legs of the 
defendant because the judge considered the use of 
shackles to be the responsibility of the Sheriff. This 
conclusion was found to be clearly erroneous. Be-
cause of the responsibility of the trial court to afford an 
accused a fair and impartial trial, as part of due pro-
cess, the trial court must exercise its discretion in 
such matters. A defendant has the right to appear at 
trial without shackles except when the court, in the 
exercise of sound discretion, determines that restraint 
is necessary for the safe and orderly progress of the 
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trial. Also, for effective appellate review, the record 
should reflect the factors which the court considered 
!n exercising its discretion. State v. Carter, 53 Ohio 
App.2d 125 (Scioto Cty. 1977). 
Uncorroborated Testimony of Accomplice 
R.C. 2923.03(D), which states that "[n]o person 
shall be convicted of complicity under this section 
solely upon the testimony of an accomplice, unsup-
port~ by other evidence," changes the general rule 
formerly recognized in State v. Flonnory, 31 Ohio 
St.2d 124 (1972), that a conviction may be based on 
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, except 
where otherwise specifically provided by statute. The 
testimony must be corroborated by some other fact, 
circumstance, or testimony which also points to the 
identity of the accused as the guilty actor. Evidence 
merely showing that the crime was committed is insuf-
ficient. State v. Myers, 53 Ohio St.2d 74 (Tuscarawas 
Cty. 1978). 
Death Penalty Procedure -Burden of 
Establishing Mitigating Factors 
Under Ohio's death penalty procedure, R.C. 
2929.04(8) provides a list of mitigating factors which 
may serve to allow the defendant to avoid the death 
penalty. It is, however, reversible error for a trial court 
to place the burden of proving these factors upon the 
defendant. The mitigation hearing is not adversarial in 
nature, and neither the defendant nor the prosecution 
has the burden of producing any evidence of mitigat-
ing circumstances. The defendant only bears the risk 
of non-persuasion. State v. Toth, 52 Ohio St.2d 206 
(Licking Cty. 1977). 
Grand Jury Witnesses -Miranda Warning 
The Justice Department has decided to give grand 
jury witnesses a Miranda-type warning before their 
testimony and to notify grand jury "targets" of their 
target status where appropriate. The Department also 
issued a general directive that prosecutors should not 
present a grand jury with evidence which they know 
was obtained as a "direct result of a clear constitu-
tional violation." For details see, 22 Crim. L. Rep. 
2423. 
Right to Analyze Drugs 
A defendant in a drug prosecution is denied due 
process and the right of confrontation when the state 
destroys all of the controlled substance during an un-
necessary quantitative test; the state has a duty to 
preserve some parts of the substance so that an in-
dependent chemical analysis may be made by the 
putative law violator in the event criminal prosecution 
is later instituted. People v. Taylor, 369 N.E.2d 573, 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1977). 
Search and Seizure 
Defendant was arrested, handcuffed, and escorted 
by police back into the room from which he came. The 
Court held that a search of the room and seizure of 
marijuana plants growing by the windows was invalid 
because it involved areas beyond the confined reach 
of the defendant.· Police observation of such plants 
from the street would also not furnish sufficient basis 
tor such a warrantless seizure. People v. Robbins, 
369 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. App. 1977). 
Search and Seizure 
Both due process and fourth amendment rights 
were violated when police seized a packet of heroin 
from the defendant's throat by choking and holding his 
nose to prevent him from swallowing. Such behavior 
is reminiscent of, if not more excessive than, that 
condemned in Aochin v. California. The Court also 
held a search warrant for a residence invalid since it 
was based upon (1) information supplied by" the 
defendant's children merely that he maintained 
another residence (no information on criminal ac-
tivities), (2) the heroin illegally seized from the defen-
dant, and (3) an informant's statement that he be-
lieved the heroin was stashed nearby. The iilegally 
seized heroin tainted the warrant under Wong Sun v. 
u.s. and the independent information was insufficient 
to provide probable cause. State v. Tapp, 22 Grim. L. 
Rep. 2344 (La. Sup. Ct. 1977). 
Plain View 
To justify a warrantless entry to seize suspected 
narcotics paraphernalia under a plain view theory, it 
must be immediately apparent to the police that they 
have evidence before them. Where the opening of the 
door of a house by the wife of a man arrested for a 
narcotics violation allowed a detective to view spoons 
and strainers on top of a kitchen refrigerator, there 
was no probable cause to believe that these items 
were employed in narcotics activities, and thus their 
seizure did not fall within the rule. U.S. v. Benn, 22 
Grim. L. Rep. 2300 (E.D. N.Y. 1977). 
Plain View 
An officer, who had recently sold his mobile home, 
returned to it to inquire about possessions which he 
had left there. While speaking to the defendant 
through an open window, the officer noticed marijuana 
plants growing inside the trailer. The officer then ar-
rested the defendant and seized the plants. The Court 
found that as a foundational prerequisite for the appli-
cation of the "plain view" doctrine, there must be a 
showing by the state of exigent circumstances. Plain 
view of evidence, standing alone, is an insufficient jus-
tification for warrantless seizures. There were found to 
be no exigent circumstances here because there was 
no suggestion of potential flight or destruction of the 
evidence. Thus, the search and seizure were un-
reasonable. The Court also held that the plain view 
doctrine does not extend to pre-intrusion observation 
of evidence within a "constitutionally protected area", 
but only to cases where there is a justifiable prior in-
trusion. State v. Lane, 22 Grim. L. Rep. 2397 (Mont. 
Sup. Ct. 1977). 
Phone Call Interception- Consent Search 
The Court rejected the government's contention 
that the right to conduct a premises search, whether 
based upon probable cause or consent, includes the 
right to intercept incoming phone calis. Where con-
sent is involved, the government must prove that it 
7 
was freely, voluntarily and knowledgeably given and 
that the interception of phone calls was within the 
scope of consent. Since the consent obtained was to 
allow the search of premises for money or cocaine, it 
did not include the right to intercept incoming phone 
calls. People v. Harwood, 22 Grim. L. Rep. 2298 
(Calif. Ct. App. 1977). 
Unreasonable Automobile Search 
Defendant was arrested for driving with an invalid 
permit. Prior to arrest, the officer saw the defendant 
make "furtive movements" and place a brown paper 
bag under the car seat. The car was then driven to the 
police station where the bag was examined and con-
traband discovered. The Court held the search un-
reasonable on several grounds. First, the search 
could not be sustained as a warrantless automobile 
search because the officer did not have probable 
cause to search at the scene of the stop; the 
defendant's movements and the partially hidden bag 
were insufficient to establish probable cause. Second, 
it could not be upheld as an inventory search because 
the authorities must lawfully possess the car. Here the 
police had no authority to impound the car without first 
obtaining the defendant's consent or providing him an 
opportunity to make other arrangements for its dispo-
sition. Third, the search was not incident to arrest be-
cause it did not occur at the time or place of the ar-
rest. Finally, the Court rejected the contention that the 
search was a "minimal" intrusion and thus reasonable 
despite the absence of probable cause. Arrington v. 
U.S., 22 Grim. L. Rep. 2411 (D.C. Ct. App. 1978). 
Involuntary Confessions 
Despite the initiation of a second inteiView with the 
police by a teenaged defendant, the Court found the 
confession made during that interview was inadmissi-
ble because of the police's repeated refusal to supply 
a requested attorney and because of improper police 
threats and inducements made during the course of 
the first interview. People v. McClary, 22 Grim. L. 
Rep. 2304 (Calif. Sup. Ct. 1977). 
Impeachment by Silence 
A federal prison inmate, working as a janitor, found 
an envelope containing marijuana. Guards later 
searched him and discovered the envelope. The in-
mate was not asked any questions and remained si-
lent until he was subsequently interviewed by the FBI. 
Upon trial for possession of marijuana, the prosecutor 
commented in closing argument on the defendant's 
silence at the time of the search. In reviewing whether 
these comments constituted reversible error, the 
Court held that when an accused has not been given 
a Miranda warning, his silence cannot be used to im-
peach his credibility, unless the silence is inconsistent 
with innocence as well as with his exculpatory trial 
testimony. The Court concluded that the defendant's 
silence was consistent with his innocence and with his 
statement to the FBI agent that he remained silent 
because the guards did not ask him any questions 
and because he feared reprisals from other inmates 
who might consider him a "snitch." Thus, the com-
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ments were "highly prejudicial" and constituted plain 
error. U.S. v. Henderson, 22 Crim. L. Rep. 2388, (5th 
Cir. 1978). 
Collateral Estoppel 
Where the defendant's imprisonment in another 
state made it impossible for him to join in his 
co-indictee's successful suppression motion, it was 
held that the absent defendant may not later be pros-
ecuted with the suppressed evidence. The Court 
stated that the principles of fairness underlying the 
collateral estoppel doctrine require the defendant be 
afforded the benefits of the earlier ruling that the 
search was unlawful. In so holding, the Court adopted 
a flexible approach to collateral estoppel which fo-
cuses on the type of litigation and the details of the 
prior adjudication. State v. Gonzales, 22 Crim. L. Rep. 
2346 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1977). 
Withdrawal of Involuntary Guilty Plea 
Defendant and his co-defendant pled guilty to an 
indictment pursuant to a plea bargaining agreement 
signed by the prosecutor and the public defender. De-
fendant later moved to withdraw his plea. In holding 
.that the district court abused its discretion in not allow-
ing withdrawal, the Court pointed out that the defen-
dant had always m?intained his innocence and had 
only pled guilty after being induced to do so by his 
attorney of record. The attorney had told the defen-
dant that he did not have a very good chance at trial 
and that his co-defendant planned to plead guilty. As 
a result, the defendant felt he could not prove his in-
nocence. This raised serious doubts about the volun-
tariness of the plea - doubts which should be resol-
ved in the defendant's favor. Gladu v. Eight Judicial 
District, 22 Crim. L. Rep. 2483 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1978). 
Right To Be Present At Trial 
At a bench conference following the presentation of 
evidence in a criminal trial, the trial court considered 
the possible bias of a juror. On appeal, the Court held 
that such a conference was a stage of trial at which 
the accused had a right to be present. Because the 
bench conference involved a determination as to the 
make-up of the jury, it was just as much a stage of the 
trial as the initial impaneling of the jury. Therefore the 
defendant had the right to be present, a right that 
could not be waived by counsel. Bunch v. State, 22 
Crim. L. Rep. 2415 (Md. Ct. App. 1978). 
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Hearsay Evidence -Guilty by Insinuation 
Where the prosecution repeatedly referred to the 
defendant by an alias and there was no admissible 
p~oof that the defendant was in fact known by that 
ahas, the defense was fatally prejudiced. The result of 
this tactic of insinuation was to "splash" the defendant 
with damaging matter that was not in evidence. U.S. 
v. Hilliard, 22 Crim. L. Rep. 2350 (D.C. Ct. App. 
1977). 
Dismissal of Charge Added After 
Defendants Assert Bail Rights 
The Court dismissed a conspiracy count which was 
addeci to the charges against the defendants, after 
their successful assertion of a right to bail. The Court 
was concerned that the additional charges would give 
the appearance of prosecutorial vindictiveness. The 
suggested justifications of the inexperience of the 
prosecutor and the unavailability of the grand jury 
were rejected. It is the appearance of vindictiveness, 
and not the actuality of such, which is crucial. U.S. v. 
Andrews, 22 Crim. L. Rep. 2481 (U.S.D.C., E.D. 
Mich. 1978). 
Dual Representation 
The Eight Circuit has extended its rule that trial 
judges have an affirmative duty to advise defendants 
of the potential danger of joint representation and of 
their rights to conflict-free counsel to cases involving 
retained counsel. Heretofore the rule was applied to 
appointed counsel cases. Absent such notification, a 
finding of knowing and intelligent waiver will seldom 
be sustained by the court. U.S. v. Lawriw, 22 Crim. L. 
Rep. 2369 (8th Cir. 1977.) 
Unconstitutionality of Marijuana Law 
The Court declared Florida's marijuana law uncon-
stitutional as applied to private possession because 
the legislature lacked a rationale basis for the decision 
to ban the private possession of marijuana. The Court 
found that the state failed to show that public health, 
safety or welfare justified such legislation. The Court 
also found the statute violative of the eighth amend-
ment ban against cruel and unusual punishment be-
cause the punishment provided in the statute (up to 5 
years imprisonment for private possession): (1) 
makes no measurable contribution to acceptable 
goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than 
the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and 
suffering; and (2) is grossly out of proportion to the 
severity of the crime. State v. Leigh, 22 Crim. L. Rep. 
2407 (Fla. Cir. Ct., 1978). 
